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demic value is high and the ancil-
lary benefits are considerable. 
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To Live And To Die: When, Why, and How 
Edited by Robert H. Williams, M.D. 
N ew York: Springer V erlag, 1974 
To Live And To Die is a collec-
tion of essays on ethical problems 
that would be of interest to medi-
cal students and physicians. The 
book resulted from a course given 
on these topics under the direc-
tion of the editor of the book, 
Robert H. Williams, M.D. All the 
topics have to do with the control 
and way of life made possible by 
recent scientific and technical 
progress, although not all of them 
would be classified as medical 
ethics, or even bioethics. Such 
subjects, for instance, as campus 
protest, the choice of a career, 
and maniage are treated in the 
collection. 
Williams himself, besides con-
tributing a lengthy prologue and 
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epilogue to the book, was respon-
sible for several chapters on spe-
cific topics. His own ethics would 
have to be classified as liberal and 
purely secular or humanistic. He 
shows little understanding of, and 
less sympathy for, a religious eth-
ic. He sees little value in suffer-
ing. To escape it, he can find no 
fault with positive euthanasia at 
the request of the patient, or even 
suicide. Contraception is prefer-
able to abortion, but if it fails 
abortion should be used as a 
hackup. 
Williams sees no more than a 
difference of degree between abor-
tion and contraception. Since 
there is life both in the sperm and 
the ovum, even contraception in-
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volves " killing." Abortion differs 
only in that the killing takes place 
at a later stage of development. 
Williams is really repeating here 
an old scholastic position, but un-
like the scholastics he uses the 
analogy not to condemn contra-
ception, but to justify abortion. 
I t was easier to argue for a differ-
ence of degree between contracep-
tion and abortion in the days 
when it was thought that the 
male semen (the ovum was not 
yet discovered, nor even the 
sperm) was the sole source of pro-
creation. It is less easy to take 
this position in the light of pres-
ent knowledge that "new life" be-
gins with fertilization . 
As for human life, Williams 
seems to build it around rational 
function, which he calls menta-
tion. Without mentation the body 
is of no use, and without menta-
tion there is no soul. Even if one 
were to presume that the soul 
comes and goes with actual men-
tation (as he seems to imply, but 
which one would hesitate to do) , 
since mentation is not in itself a 
sensible phenomenon, it would 
not be easy to establish its ab-
sence. The absence of mentation 
would hardly be useful as a cri-
terion for a euthanasia decision , 
which Williams would want it 
to be. 
Two Different Approaches 
to Morality 
It would be impossible to con-
sider adequately in a brief review 
all the issues taken up in this 
book, but it may be helpful to the 
reader to give some attention to a 
confrontation between two differ-
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ent approaches to morality as re-
flected in the articles of Arthur 
Dyck and Joseph Fletcher on eu-
thanasia. Dyck takes the tradi-
tional stand a g a ins t positive 
euthanasia; it is a violation of the 
injunction against killing. But 
there is a difference against caus-
ing death and permitting one to 
die (by not using extraordinary 
means). There is also a difference 
between administering a drug to 
cause death and administering it 
to relieve pain, even though it has 
the added effect of shortening 
life. One might ask what is the 
difference if death follows in both 
cases. Dyck argues that the per-
son who takes a drug to relieve 
pain is not making a choice of 
death but a choice of how to live 
while dying. Similarly, one who 
decides not to use extraordinary 
means is not making a choice of 
death but only a choice of how to 
spend his last days in the most 
meaningful way. He is making 
exactly the same choices he might 
make during his life to take a 
drug to relieve a headache, or 
simply to see a doctor or not. 
But to cause one's own death 
is to decide that one's life has no 
worth for anyone. I t is also a way 
of shutting other people out of 
your life. Also, if one can take his 
life whenever he decides it is 
meaningless, why does he have to 
wait until he is dying? Why can-
not he make the decision when-
ever during his life he decides it 
is meaningless? For these and 
other reasons Dyck cannot justify 
positive euthanasia. 
Joseph Fletcher, on the con-
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trary, finds it harder to justify 
letting a person die a slow and 
ugly death than helping him es-
cape from such misery. This is a 
euphemistic way of saying that it 
is preferable for a doctor to put a 
patient to death in these circum-
stances. Fletcher says rightly that 
it is ridiculous to give ethical ap-
proval to ending "subhuman" life 
in utero, as is done in abortion, 
and refuse to end "subhuman" 
life in extremis. Unfortunately, 
instead of using the analogy to 
show that abortion is wrong he 
uses it to try to justify positive 
euthanasia. The real question 
here, according to Fletcher, is not 
whether you are permitting death 
or causing it, rather, it is whether 
you have a proportionate reason. 
If you have a proportionate rea-
son, it does not make any differ-
ence to Fletcher whether you kill 
a person or let him die. While he 
admits that not any end will 
justify an evil means, h!l holds 
that a proportionate good will. 
Basically, Fletcher is espousing 
here a morality of consequences 
which judges moral acts accord-
ing to the goodness or badness of 
their consequences. He would jus-
tify positive euthanasia, presum-
ably, as an escape from the mis-
ery of a slow death. 
Fletcher contrasts t his ap-
proach with that of the so-called 
deontologist, who argues that an 
act is good or bad according as it 
conforms to a rule - and inde-
pendently of the consequences. 
According to the deontologist po-
sitive euthanasia is wrong because 
it violates the rule : Thou shalt 
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not kill! Strictly speaking, the 
deontologist approach is Kantian, 
and it is a little simplistic to 
group all other moral systems un-
der this heading. In the tradition-
al scholastic position killing an 
innocent person is not wrong be-
cause there is a rule against it. 
There is a rule against it because 
it is wrong for other reasons. But 
it is wrong not precisely because 
it has bad consequences, but be-
cause it goes against man's ra-
tional nature to kill an innocent 
fellowman. It asserts a superiority 
that has no rational foundation. 
The fact that in an individual 
case or situation good conse-
quences might result from such a 
killing will not justify it. The end 
does not justify the means. It was 
on this basis, for instance, that 
St. Thomas refused to allow a 
mother to be cut open to provide 
for the baptism of a baby who 
could not otherwise be baptized. 
In the thirteenth century per-
forming a caesarean section on a 
live mother was tantamount to 
taking her life. Even though the 
spiritual welfare of the child (cer-
tainly a proportionate reason) 
was being weighed against the 
temporal welfare of the mother, 
St. Thomas did not think the op-
eration could be performed, and 
precisely because a good end 
would not justify a bad means. 
In all fairness to consequential-
ists it should be said that not all 
of them would agree with Fletch-
er that there is a "proportionate 
reason" for positive euthanasia. 
As Dyck points out, while many 
would admit the possibility of a 
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proportiona te good resulting if 
one considers only the patient, 
they would fear the consequences 
of allowing a practice like this to 
begin. It would be on the basis of 
such "secondary" consequences 
that they would condemn it. 
Monogamous Marriage Examined 
In a chapter on marriage David 
R. Mace raises the question of 
the future of monogamous mar-
riage. He faces openly all the rea-
sons that put it in question. First, 
there is the shift in emphasis 
from marriage as a social and 
familial institution to marriage 
as a means of personal and inter-
personal fulfillment. Given the 
population problem, there is no 
need for every marriage to be pro-
creative. In fact, procreation might 
be carried on in a way more ge-
netically satisfying, if only select 
men and women were to have chil-
dren. Similarly, there may no long-
er be need of the family as a place 
to nurture children. Conceivably, 
this could be carried on in a more 
sophisticated and professional 
way through other media. Nor is 
there the same reason in modern 
society for confining sexual rela-
tions to a marital union. Sexual 
jealousy does not seem to ha:ve 
the same destructive force that it 
had in the past. There seems to 
be no need of the traditional 
sexual exclusiveness of the mar-
riage bond, which raises the ques-
tion whether it is necessary at all. 
Really, love and creativity are es-
sentially spontaneous, which im-
plies that an atmosphere of ob-
ligation and commitment is not 
the best for fostering them. There 
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are eve!). those who do not think 
that young people should be re-
quired to make a life commitment 
at a time when they are incapable 
of grasping its meaning. 
While admitting that marriage 
today is in trouble, Mace protests 
that there are also some very suc-
cessful marriages in our society. 
Rather than abandon traditional 
marriage precipitously, would it 
not be better to examine these 
successful marriages to discover 
why they succeeded? He pleads 
that in our modern world, where 
one can get lost in impersonalism, 
there is more need for a relation 
in depth with some other person 
than ever before. Does not mar-
riage offer a unique opportunity 
for such an experience - one 
which most people crave today -
a deeply satisfying, dependable 
relationship of complete openness, 
complete trust and complete shar-
ing of life with one loved person 
of the opposite sex? Mace is ob-
viously not overwhelmed by the 
arguments against monogamous 
marriage. 
The chapter on homosexuality, 
transvestism and transsexualism, 
while brief, seems fairly well bal-
anced. The aut h 0 r, John L. 
Hampson, makes it clear that he 
is dealing with an adult homo-
sexual orientation, not with a 
passing stage or superficial homo-
sexual conduct. On the legal level, 
he is in favor of not legislating 
against consensual acts between 
adults. He does not think that 
homosexuality is a disease in the 
strict sense of the term, but finds 
it more useful to look upon it as a 
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developmental problem. It is a 
disorientation acquired early in 
life as the result of certain non-
standard experiences. In view of 
this, while he is willing to refrain 
from applying such terms as sick-
ness or illness to it, he does not 
agree that it is simply an alter-
native life style. Since it results 
from atypical psychosexual de-
velopment, the homosexual has 
no more choice in his life style 
than the heterosexual. As for the 
possibility of reorientation, he 
says that perhaps one-third of 
homosexuals can be successfully 
treated. This is a little more op-
timistic than some estimates, a 
little less than others. 
He touches only sketchily on 
transvestism and transsexualism. 
He breaks transvestism down into 
three types: the type who uses 
female dress for erotic stimula-
tion, the compulsive type, and 
the expressive type who merely 
wants to express a feminine side 
of his personality (they are all 
men). This last type differs from 
the transsexual in that these 
transvestites do not con sid e r 
themselves females trapped in a 
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male body. There has not been 
much success in dealing with the 
erotic or expressive type trans-
vestite. More success has been 
reported in the hormonal and 
surgical t rea t men t of trans-
sexuals, but authors other than 
Hampson do not feel that we 
have enough long-term experience 
with this type of therapy to be 
confident about it. Hampson con-
cludes wisely that our ultimate 
goal should be rather the preven-
tion of such disorders as trans-
sexualism. 
The reader will find a number 
of other interesting topics treated 
in the present book. He will find 
it profitable reading, even though 
he may not always find himself 
in agreement with opinions ex-
pressed in it. He will regret also 
the complete absence of any rec-
ognition of the contribution which 
Catholic moral theologians have 
made to the field of medical eth-
ics over the past centuries. 
Reviewed by: 
John Connery, S.J. 
Bellarmine School of Theology 
Chicago, Illinois 
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